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Abstract
This paper compares the relative performance of different organizational structures
for the decision of accepting or rejecting a project of uncertain quality. When the prin-
cipal is uninformed and relies on the advice of an informed and biased agent, cheap-talk
communication is persuasive and it is equivalent to delegation of authority, provided
that the agent’s bias is small. When the principal has access to additional private infor-
mation, cheap-talk communication dominates both (conditional) delegation and more
democratic organizational arrangements such as voting with unanimous consensus.
1 Introduction
Mortgage applications are channeled through loan officers who are typically rewarded upon
successful completion of the loan. Final acceptance or rejection depends on the judgement
of a bank’s underwriting department. Similarly, headquarters decide whether or not to
finance projects based on proposals by division managers who typically stand to gain from
the approval. And before deciding whether to accept or reject a paper, the journal editor
consults an expert referee who, being a specialist, is known to be biased.
In these situations, an expert principal decides whether to accept or reject a project in
consultation with a biased expert agent who possesses some additional information relevant
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for the decision. It is natural to wonder how the principal should organize the collection of
information.
This article compares the performance of different organizational structures for aggregat-
ing information. Our point of departure is the pioneering work by Sah and Stiglitz (1986)
on how the organization of experts affects the quality of decision making. While Sah and
Stiglitz do not consider how the experts’ reporting changes depending on the organization
structure, we follow Holmstro¨m (1977) and Crawford and Sobel (1982) by focusing on the
incentives for strategic manipulation by fully strategic players with misaligned preferences.1
Given our applications to project approval, we focus on a simple model with two actions,
two states, and continuous noisy signals. This model is largely based on Li, Rosen, and Suen
(2001) and Li and Suen (2004).2
The principal and the agent observe continuously distributed, conditionally independent,
signals about the state of the world. After observing her signal, the principal can decide the
organization of communication. That is, the principal can ask the agent to report (i.e., cheap
talk communication), or can delegate authority to the agent (i.e., conditional delegation), or
can use more democratic arrangements like voting. We will consider two cases, one where the
principal’s signal is uninformative (Section 2), the other where the two signals are identically
distributed (Section 3).
When the principal is uninformed, cheap talk communication is “persuasive” if either (i)
the bias is small or (ii) the uninformed principal favors acceptance based on prior informa-
tion, given that we assume that the agent’s signal has an unbounded likelihood ratio. In
both scenarios, the agent is able to influence the principal’s decision by sending a recommen-
dation which pools some relatively unfavorable signals with enough favorable signals to make
acceptance optimal. An increase in the agent’s bias reduces the quality of communication
and increases the probability of accepting a bad project (i.e., Type-I error).
When the receiver/principal is uninformed, in our model the informative equilibrium
with cheap talk communication results in the same outcome as delegation of authority. This
result contrasts with results obtained in a model with continuous action and symmetric
loss function by Ottaviani (2000) and Dessein (2002), based on Crawford and Sobel (1982),
where delegation dominates communication for small biases.3 This difference stems from the
1See also the recent contributions by Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek
(2008), and Rantakari (2008).
2Another branch of the literature has focused on the impact of the organizational structure on the quality
of decision making when experts are motivated by professional, rather than partisan, concerns; see Ottaviani
and Sørensen (2001).
3Ottaviani (2000) also shows that when there is uncertainty about the agent’s bias in Crawford and
Sobel’s (1982) model cheap talk dominates delegation, an observation which has been investigated further
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fact that in Crawford and Sobel’s model the agent’s bias leads only to a loss of information
whereas the equilibrium action is unbiased. With only two actions, there is instead persuasion
in equilibrium because a restricted (binary) action space increases the informativeness of
cheap-talk communication by reducing the set of the sender’s incentive constraints.4
When the principal is partially informed, cheap talk communication dominates condi-
tional delegation of authority to the agent (that is, delegation after the principal has re-
ceived her information). With conditional delegation, an expert principal retains authority
either if she received a very low signal, which makes unilateral rejection optimal without the
need to consult the agent, or else if she received a very high signal, which makes unilateral
acceptance optimal. After receiving authority, the agent infers that the principal’s signal
belongs to an intermediate interval and he best responds by recommending acceptance when
his own signal exceeds a cutoff. The principal could instead allow the agent to make an
accept/reject recommendation while retaining authority over the final decision. With this
restricted cheap talk communication, the agent once again adopts a cutoff strategy which
leads the principal to follow the recommendation only when her own signal falls in an in-
termediate interval.5 Given that the principal correctly anticipates the agent’s equilibrium
strategy under conditional delegation, she is indifferent between letting the agent make the
decision or following the agent’s recommendation. Therefore, allowing for richer commu-
nication protocols improves the quality of communication which makes cheap talk strictly
better than conditional delegation.6
Cheap talk communication also dominates voting with unanimous consensus. This occurs
because conditional delegation is superior to voting. The intuition is that delegation makes
the agent with authority behave more conservatively when deciding to accept. A vote to
accept leads to acceptance if, and only if, the principal also votes to accept. Therefore, the
agent can afford to behave in a less cautious manner when voting.
It is natural to wonder how the optimal mechanism without transfers would look like in
by Rush, Smirnov, and Wait (2009). Recently, Agastya, Bag, and Chakraborty (2013) have shown that the
comparison between cheap talk communication and delegation becomes ambiguous even for small biases in
the presence of residual uncertainty, that is, when the agent only observes a dimension of the state of the
world. We instead assume that the agent’s bias is known and that the agent observes a partially informative
signal about the state of the world.
4As a result, the message space can only contain up to two messages.
5When the principal receives a very high signal, she accepts regardless of the agent’s recommendation.
Similarly, she always rejects following a low signal.
6Existence of an informative equilibrium for any size of the bias follows from the fact that the likelihood
ratios are unbounded with our signal structure. If the likelihood ratios were bounded, unlike in our baseline
model, the feasibility of communication would clearly depend on the size of the bias as in standard cheap
talk models. Our result would then hold for small biases.
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our setting with an expert principal. We provide a partial characterization of such mechanism
in Section 3.5. When the principal can commit to the way in which she uses the information
transmitted by the agent, a new trade-off arises. This trade-off involves a suppression of
information on the principal’s side in order to reduce the amount of strategic manipulation
performed by the agent. By committing to suppress some of her information, the principal
induces the agent to adopt a higher standard when recommending acceptance, which might
increase the quality of decision making.
This article contributes to a growing literature on cheap talk communication with a pri-
vately informed receiver. In an early analysis of cheap talk games with an informed receiver,
Seidmann (1990) shows through examples that private information may help communication.
Chen (2009) shows that correlation between the sender and the receiver’s information gen-
erates non-monotone equilibria in the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982), while Moreno de
Barreda (2013) shows that the quality of communication decreases in the precision of the
principal’s signal about the state of the world in the uniform-quadratic model. Ishida and
Shimizu (2013) investigate the impossibility of informative communication in a binary action-
binary state model, as in our framework, in which the sender and receiver observe discrete
signals. Unlike those papers, we further investigate the organization of communication.
In a related paper, Harris and Raviv (2005) consider a uniform-quadratic model in which
both the sender and the receiver possess independent pieces of information about different
dimensions of the state of the world which enter additively in the utility functions. When the
receiver has no information, their model collapses to Crawford and Sobel’s and delegation
dominates communication as in Dessein.7 Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2013) consider a setting
similar to Harris and Raviv’s with a binary action space and three players: shareholders, who
are uninformed, a board and management who both possess different pieces of information.
When shareholders can choose the board’s bias, the optimal board renders the allocation of
authority irrelevant provided that there is consensus between board and management. In
contrast, we consider environments in which the sender and the receiver possess independent
pieces of information about the same dimension of uncertainty.8
7McGee (2013) generalizes the model of Harris and Raviv (2005) by considering the case in which the
marginal contribution of the sender’s information to the optimal action depends on the principal’s informa-
tion.
8Marino (2007) studies the trade-off between delegation and veto power in a game with a continuous state
space. The agent proposes to the principal the size of an investment based on observation of the state of the
world. He shows that veto power may dominate delegation even when the agent’s bias is small by inducing
the agent to avoid certain low quality projects. Mylovanov (2008) shows more generally how veto-based
delegation can be employed by a principal to implement an optimal outcome by carefully selecting a default
decision in case of veto.
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2 Uninformed Principal Dealing with Expert Agent
A principal, P , needs to make a decision d ∈ {Reject, Accept} regarding a project of unknown
quality. Before making this decision, the principal consults an agent, A. For example,
headquarters decide whether or not to finance a project after consulting an expert division
manager.
There is an unknown state of the world θ ∈ {B,G} which is relevant for the decision. If
the principal rejects, both players receive a payoff which is normalized to 0. If the state of
the world is B (or bad), acceptance generates a payoff equal to −RB < 0 for each player. If
the state of the world is G (or good), acceptance generates a payoff equal to RG + bi with
RG > 0 for player i ∈ {P,A}. We assume that bP = 0 < bA ≡ b. Thus, the principal is
unbiased whereas the agent is biased toward acceptance. We denote by p = Prob(θ = G)
the common prior about the good state.
Information. The agent receives a signal sA ∈ S = [0, 1] about the state of the world
which is distributed according to a continuous density function fθ(·) with distribution func-
tion Fθ(·), θ = B,G. The signal structure satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP), that is, fG(s)
fB(s)
is increasing in s.
We introduce some notation which will become useful in the analysis. Define l(s) = fG(s)
fB(s)
,
L(s) = 1−FG(s)
1−FB(s) , K(s) =
FG(s)
FB(s)
, and finally L(s1, s2) = FG(s2)−FG(s1)FB(s2)−FB(s1) , for s2 > s1. MLRP then
implies the following properties:
1. K(s) < 1 < L(s), for any s ∈ (0, 1);
2. K(s) and L(s) are increasing functions of s;
3. L(s1, s2) is increasing in both s1 and s2, for s1 < s2;
4. For any s1 < s2 < s3, L(s1, s2) < l(s2) < L(s2, s3).
For reasons of tractability, we will often employ a linear signal structure with fG(s) =
2s and fB(s) = 2(1 − s). This signal specification corresponds to a binary signal with
continuously varying precision and unbounded informativeness at the boundaries. This linear
signal structure guarantees existence and uniqueness of equilibria and simplifies some of the
proofs, but it is unnecessary for many of our characterization results.
Organizational Structures. The principal can commit ex ante to an organizational
structure. With an uninformed principal, two possible organizational structures are feasible.
First, the principal could ask the agent to report his signal which the principal uses to
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make a decision, that is, cheap talk communication. Second, the principal could allow the
agent to make the decision that maximizes his own utility based on his information, that is,
delegation.
The principal can make mistakes in her decision to accept or reject a project. Borrowing
from the terminology of statistical hypothesis testing, we say that the principal makes a
Type-I error (or, false acceptance) when she accepts a bad project, while she makes a Type-
II error (or, false rejection) when she rejects a good project.
2.1 Delegation
We start the analysis by considering the simpler case in which the principal delegated au-
thority to the agent. The agent uses his signal to update the posterior belief about the state
to
Prob(G|sA) = pl(sA)
pl(sA) + (1− p) . (1)
Given this updated belief, the agent accepts if, and only if, his likelihood ratio satisfies
l(sA) ≥ 1−pp RBRG+b ≡ T (b). MLRP implies that there exists a unique cutoff, t∗A(b), such that
the agent accepts if, and only if, his signal exceeds the cutoff. If the principal could instead
directly observe the agent’s signal, she would accept if, and only if, sA ≥ t∗P ≡ t∗A(0). As
t∗A(b) < t
∗
P , the agent has higher incentives to accept even after less favorable signals because
of his bias. For example, t∗A(b) ≡ T (b)1+T (b) in the context of the linear signal structure.
2.2 Cheap Talk Communication
We next consider cheap talk communication. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws the state of the world, θ.
2. The agent observes a signal sA.
3. The agent sends a costless, unverifiable, recommendation m to the principal.
4. Based on the recommendation received, the principal makes a decision d ∈ {Reject, Accept}.
When indifferent, the principal accepts.
5. The state of the world is revealed and payoffs are realized.
We show in the Appendix that for any informative equilibrium in which the agent sends
more than two messages we can construct another informative equilibrium in which the agent
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sends only two messages and which is payoff-equivalent. So, it is without loss of generality
to restrict attention to the message space M = {Reject, Accept}.
Suppose that the agent recommends to accept if, and only if, his signal sA ≥ t∗A(b). Given
such a strategy, a negative recommendation leads the principal to update her posterior belief
downward, that is, Prob (G|sA < t∗A(b)) < p. By MLRP, there exists a unique cutoff t¯∗P such
that the principal accepts if, and only if, t∗A(b) ≥ t¯∗P . The principal adopts a less permissive
rule compared to the rule she would adopt if the signal were observable, that is, t∗P < t¯
∗
P .
9
This is because the agent’s recommendation pools together very bad signals which induces
the principal to behave more conservatively.
When the agent recommends acceptance, the principal accepts if, and only if, t∗A(b) ≥ t∗P ,
where t∗P > t
∗
P . The principal employs a more permissive decision rule because a positive
recommendation increases the principal’s posterior belief to Prob (G|sA ≥ t∗A(b)) > p. With a
linear signal structure, we can solve for the cutoffs directly which gives t¯∗P ≡ min
{
2T (0)
1+T (0)
, 1
}
and t∗P = max
{
T (0)−1
T (0)+1
, 0
}
.
Proposition 1 characterizes equilibrium behavior. We say that an equilibrium is informa-
tive if d(Accept) 6= d(Reject), that is, when the final decision depends on the recommenda-
tion of the agent, and that an informative equilibrium is unique if all informative equilibria
are payoff-equivalent.
Proposition 1. Suppose that p < RB
RG+RB
, that is, the principal rejects if she has to decide
only based on prior information. Then, there exists a number b¯ > 0 such that:
1. If the agent’s bias is b ≤ b¯, the unique informative equilibrium in the communication
stage is the one in which the agent recommends acceptance if, and only if, his signal
sA ≥ t∗A(b). The principal always follows the agent’s recommendation.
2. If the agent’s bias is b > b¯, then all communication equilibria are uninformative and
the principal always rejects, regardless of the agent’s recommendation.
Suppose instead that p ≥ RB
RG+RB
. Then, the unique informative equilibrium in the com-
munication stage is the one in which the agent recommends acceptance if, and only if, his
signal sA ≥ t∗A(b). The principal always follows the agent’s recommendation.
When the prior belief of a good state is low, cheap talk communication is persuasive in
the sense that the principal accepts whenever the agent recommends acceptance, provided
9This observation follows from the fact that K(s) < l(s) by MLRP.
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that the agent’s bias is not too large.10 The principal suffers a bias because the biased agent
recommends acceptance for a region of signal realizations for which the principal would have
wanted to reject if she had observed those exact signal realizations. Essentially, in the eyes
of the principal, the agent pools some relatively unfavorable signals (for which the principal
would have liked to reject) with some relatively favorable signals that make acceptance
optimal for the principal. When the conflict of interest is not too high, for the principal the
gain associated to the reduction in the probability of a Type-II error (i.e., false rejection)
outweighs the loss associated with the increase in the Type-I error (i.e., false acceptance).
When the prior belief is high enough that the principal accepts given the prior, commu-
nication is always informative. This is intuitive because the principal would reject only if the
signal were sufficiently low, thus she has no reason to disregard the agent’s recommendation
to reject given that the agent employs a more demanding standard for rejection.
Cheap Talk versus Delegation. Provided that the agent’s bias lies below the critical
level b¯, the outcome of delegation (i.e., giving authority to the informed agent) is equivalent
to the outcome of the informative cheap talk equilibrium.11 So, in this setting when the
bias is small cheap talk is exactly equivalent to delegation. Note the contrast with Dessein’s
(2002) result that with continuous action and symmetric loss functions (as in Crawford and
Sobel 1982), for small bias the receiver prefers delegation to cheap talk.
When the bias is large, the loss outweighs the gain, so the principal always wants to
reject even when the agent wants to accept. The principal prefers cheap talk (which is
uninformative) to delegation. This result is in line with Dessein—and it is fully general—
when the cheap talk equilibrium is uninformative, delegation is a bad idea.
We summarize the discussion in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Cheap talk communication is equivalent to delegation whenever communi-
cation is informative, and it is strictly better otherwise.
2.3 Effect of Bias
The next result contains some comparative statics on the quality of decision making.
Proposition 3. The following comparative statics holds true:
10Chakraborty and Hargaugh (2010) investigate persuasion through cheap talk communication in envi-
ronments in which information is multidimensional and the agent’s preferences are state-independent (i.e.,
b = +∞ in our model).
11Clearly there is also always an uninformative cheap talk equilibrium, but it makes sense to disregard it
as not particularly natural.
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1. When communication is informative, the probability of a Type-I error (i.e., false ac-
ceptance) increases in the bias, b.
2. An increase in the prior belief, p, increases the interval of bias parameters for which
communication is informative, that is, ∂b¯/∂p > 0 for any p < RB
RG+RB
.
An increase in the bias leads the agent to recommend acceptance more often because he
has more to lose from rejection. This increases the probability of false acceptance whenever
communication is informative. A more optimistic prior belief necessarily increases the prin-
cipal’s concern of committing a Type-II error. This implies that the principal is more willing
to listen to the agent even when the agent is more biased.
Commitment by the Agent. It is important to remark that a binary action space
allows for the persuasiveness of cheap talk communication by inducing the principal to make
a decision which benefits the agent. This contrasts with cheap talk models based on Crawford
and Sobel (1982) where the equilibrium action is always unbiased.
In this simple framework, we can thus think about how the agent might increase his
expected utility if he had commitment power. We consider the case in which an agent with
bias b > 0 can credibly commit to a different bias bˆ ex-ante, that is, before observing his own
signal.12 Suppose that p < RB
RG+RB
, then an agent with bias b > 0 would optimally choose a
bias b∗ to solve
max
bˆ≥0
{
p[1− FG(t∗A(bˆ))](RG + b)− (1− p)[1− FB(t∗A(bˆ))]RB
}
1{bˆ≤b¯}. (2)
Ignoring the constraint imposed by the indicator function, the objective function is quasi-
concave and the first-order condition immediately gives that b∗ must solve l (t∗A(b
∗)) = T (b),
or b∗ = b. Therefore, for an agent with a bias b ≤ b¯, the optimal bias is exactly b. This
is because a smaller bias reduces the ex-ante probability of acceptance while a higher bias
increases it but at signal realizations for which the agent would prefer the project to be
rejected ex post. Agents with a bias greater than b¯ would instead benefit from the ability
to commit ex ante to a bias equal to b¯. Their bias induces the principal to reject with
probability 1, while persuasion occurs when b = b¯ and the principal accepts the project
with (ex-ante) positive probability. Those agents strictly benefit from informative cheap
talk communication compared to no communication. Figure 1 graphs the optimal bias b∗ as
a function of the agent’s bias b.
12Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Kolotilin (2013) investigate optimal persuasion by an agent in a
more general framework than ours. More recently, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2013) study how a
principal, like a government, can persuade a heterogeneous audience.
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b¯ b
b∗
b¯
Figure 1: Optimal bias when p < RB
RG+RB
.
When p ≥ RB
RG+RB
, equilibrium communication is always informative so the agent has no
incentive to commit to a bias different than his own. The next Proposition 4 summarizes
our discussion so far.
Proposition 4. Suppose that an agent with bias b > 0 can commit ex-ante to any nonneg-
ative bias. If p < RB
RG+RB
, then the optimal bias is b∗ = min
{
b, b¯
}
.
If p ≥ RB
RG+RB
, then b∗ = b.
The logic behind our persuasion result is reminiscent of the trade off faced by a seller in
providing information to potential buyers as in Lewis and Sappington (1994). Similar to a
seller who wants to maximize the probability of purchase by an uninformed buyer, our agent
wants to maximize the probability of acceptance by the principal when he finds acceptance
optimal.13
3 Expert Principal Dealing with Expert Agent
This section considers the more general case in which the principal and the agent observe
conditionally independent signals which are identically distributed. We denote the principal’s
13Johnson and Myatt (2006) generalize the economics behind Lewis and Sappington (1994). More recently,
Hoffmann, Inderst, and Ottaviani (2013) investigate selective disclosure of information to buyers with limited
attention.
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signal by sP . The communication stage now serves as a way for the players to aggregate
their information and potentially improve the quality of the final decision.
In the following sections, we consider several organizational structures like cheap talk
communication, conditional delegation, and voting, and compare their relative performance.
3.1 Binary Cheap Talk
Suppose for now that the agent’s message space is restricted to M = {Reject, Accept}.
Consider once again the case in which the agent uses a cutoff strategy in the communication
stage, that is, he recommends acceptance if, and only if, he receives a signal sA ≥ tCA(b).
Then, following a recommendation of acceptance, the principal can update her own posterior
belief to
Prob
(
G|sP , sA ≥ tCA(b)
)
=
pl(sP )L(t
C
A(b))
pl(sP )L(tCA(b)) + (1− p)
. (3)
The principal accepts following a recommendation of acceptance if and only if
l(sP )L(t
C
A(b)) ≥ T (0). (4)
Similarly, if the agent recommends rejection, the principal accepts if and only if
l(sP )K(t
C
A(b)) ≥ T (0). (5)
Fix the strategy of the agent. As long as the likelihood ratio is unbounded, there exist
unique solutions to conditions (4) and (5) with equality which we denote by t(tCA(b)) and
t¯(tCA(b)), respectively. For the linear signal structure, those functions are given by t(t
C
A(b)) =
T (0)
T (0)+L(tCA(b))
and t¯(tCA(b)) =
T (0)
T (0)+K(tCA(b))
.
MLRP implies that if sP ≥ t¯(tCA(b)), the principal accepts regardless of the recommen-
dation received because her own signal is already very strong. If sP ∈ [t(tCA(b)), t¯(tCA(b))),
then she accepts only after a positive recommendation. Finally, if sP < t(t
C
A(b)), she always
rejects regardless of the recommendation because her signal is very low.
The principal’s decision aggregates her own signal with the information shared by the
agent. As L(s) > 1 for any s > 0, the principal is using a lower cutoff, after a positive recom-
mendation, compared to what she would use if she had access only to her own information.
The principal increases the acceptance cutoff (K(s) < 1) after a negative recommendation
because higher signals are required to counterbalance the negative evidence provided by the
11
agent.
The next result summarizes the properties of these cutoff functions.
Lemma 5. The threshold functions t(s) and t¯(s) satisfy the following properties:
1. t(s) < t¯(s), for any s ∈ [0, 1];
2. dt(s)
ds
< 0 and dt¯(s)
ds
< 0, for any s ∈ (0, 1);
Proof. The first property follows from the fact that L(s) > 1 > K(s) for any s ∈ [0, 1].
The second property follows from the fact that both L(s) and K(s) are increasing in s by
MLRP.
Given the principal’s best-response function, the agent’s recommendation matters only
when the principal’s signal lies in the interval
[
t(tCA(b)), t¯(t
C
A(b))
)
. Thus, the agent recom-
mends acceptance if and only if
UA
(
t(tCA(b)) ≤ sP < t¯(tCA(b))|sA
) ≥ 0. (6)
The next proposition characterizes equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 6. Suppose that there exists a number tCA(b) ∈ (0, 1) such that the following
condition holds:
l(tCA(b))L(t(tCA(b)), t¯(tCA(b))) = T (b). (7)
Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent recommends acceptance in the commu-
nication stage if, and only if, his signal sA ≥ tCA(b).14
With a linear signal structure, there always exists a unique interior equilibrium for any
bias b > 0. An increase in the bias increases the agent’s strategic manipulation of his
information, that is, tCA(b) decreases.
It is important to point out that the characterization of communication equilibria pro-
vided by Proposition 6 holds for any signal structure that satisfies MLRP. It also holds when
each player holds information of different quality. For example, we could modify the sig-
nal structure by assuming that player i observes an informative signal with probability αi
and the signal is pure noise with probability 1 − αi. However, existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium is not guaranteed with an arbitrary signal structure.
14As usual, there always exists an equilibrium which is completely uninformative, however we disregard
that equilibrium as uninteresting.
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Provided that the likelihood ratio is unbounded, the equilibrium of the communication
stage is informative for any size of the bias. The principal uses his own signal as well as the
information shared by the agent. The equilibrium also exhibits manipulation because the
biased agent recommends acceptance more often than he would if he were unbiased. The
principal responds to this manipulation by accepting less often than she would with a less
biased agent. Intuitively, the principal compensates for the agent’s bias by reducing the
agent’s influence over the final decision. An increase in the bias further exacerbates this
manipulation which leads to a larger loss of information.
In equilibrium, the agent bases his recommendation on the event in which his recom-
mendation influences the final decision. This occurs when the principal’s information is
somewhat inconclusive. However, the agent’s equilibrium cutoff determines endogenously
the set of the principal’s signal realizations which provide insufficient evidence for a unilat-
eral decision to be optimal. If the principal were to decide based only on her own information,
she would reject if l(sP ) < T (0) or sP < t
∗
P . With communication, the principal finds uni-
lateral rejection optimal only if l(sP )L(t
C
A(b)) < T (0) or sP < t(t
C
A(b)). Since L(s) > 1, then
t∗P > t(t
C
A(b)). Thus, the principal uses the agent’s recommendation for any signal realization
between t(tCA(b)) and t
∗
P , while she would have rejected given her private information alone.
3.2 Conditional Delegation
After observing her own signal, the principal might delegate authority to the agent, what
we call conditional delegation.
With an expert principal, delegating authority is informative because the agent infers that
the principal’s signal must be somewhat inconclusive. Intuitively, the principal is unwilling
to delegate when her signal is very optimistic, and her information provides enough evidence
for acceptance, or else the signal is very pessimistic and rejection is already optimal without
the agent’s information. Delegation can only occur for an intermediate set of the principal’s
signals.15 While delegation induces an optimal use of the agent’s information, it leads to a
loss of information at signal realizations for which the principal is unwilling to delegate.
Proposition 7 (Li and Suen (2004)). For a given bias b > 0, an equilibrium of the delegation
game (if it exists) is given by a triple
(
tDA(b), t
D
1 (b), t
D
2 (b)
)
which solves the following equations:
l(tDA(b))L(tD1 (b), tD2 (b)) = T (b), (8)
15The principal could also delegate when her signal exceeds a cutoff and retain authority otherwise. Li and
Suen (2004) show that this delegation mechanism is dominated by delegation only for intermediate signals.
Therefore, we focus on the latter type of delegation.
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l(tD1 (b))L(t
D
A(b)) = T (0), (9)
l(tD2 (b))K(t
D
A(b)) = T (0). (10)
Given the agent’s reporting cutoff tDA(b), the principal selects the cutoff t
D
2 (b) conditional
on the event in which the agent received a signal below tDA(b) (condition (10)). This implies
that the principal would prefer acceptance for any signal sP ≥ tD2 (b) when the agent received
a signal below tDA(b). Thus, the principal prefers to retain authority because the agent would
otherwise reject. Similarly, the principal chooses the cutoff tD1 (b) based on the event in which
the agent received a signal above tDA(b) (condition (9)). In this case, she retains authority
for signals sP < t
D
1 (b) to prevent the agent from accepting.
In equilibrium, the agent anticipates that the principal will delegate authority when her
signal lies in the interval [tD1 (b), t
D
2 (b)], and retains authority otherwise. Thus, the equilibrium
reporting cutoff tDA(b) is the one at which the agent is indifferent between recommending
acceptance or rejection (condition (8)).
A linear signal structure guarantees existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under con-
ditional delegation.16
Cheap Talk vs. Conditional Delegation. We now compare the relative performance of
cheap talk communication with conditional delegation.
Proposition 8. Cheap talk communication with a binary message space is equivalent to
conditional delegation.
Proposition 8 shows that the principal is indifferent between cheap talk communication
with a binary message space and conditional delegation. This is because the principal knows,
in equilibrium, how the agent will condition his decision on his own information, thus com-
munication becomes unnecessary. This result may be generalized to the case in which the
principal and the agent have access to information of different quality so that the agent has
again higher expertise than the principal, provided that a unique equilibrium exists.
Note again the contrast with Dessein’s (2002) result that for small biases delegation is
strictly preferred to cheap talk. This is the case even if a small bias in Dessein’s model allows
for a higher quality of communication than in this set-up in which the agent’s message space
has been restricted to only two messages. Therefore, cheap talk will dominate conditional
delegation if there exists an equilibrium in which more than two messages are sent.
16We refer to the proof of Proposition 6 for a formal argument.
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3.3 Voting
A commonly studied decision procedure with multiple informed agents is voting. So, suppose
that both players can express their opinion in favor or against the project, after observing
their own signal, through a voting mechanism.17 In particular, suppose that acceptance of
the project requires a unanimous consensus between the two players. Even though there is no
explicit communication between the players before voting takes place, the voting mechanism
itself allows for information sharing.
This organizational structure has been studied by Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001). They
show that an interior equilibrium (tVP (b), t
V
A(b)) must simultaneously satisfy the following
two conditions
l(tVP (b))L(t
V
A(b)) = T (0), (11)
l(tVA(b))L(t
V
P (b)) = T (b). (12)
Then, player i votes for acceptance if, and only if, si ≥ tVi (b). Intuitively, player i’s vote is
pivotal when the other player votes for acceptance which, given the equilibrium strategies,
occurs with a likelihood ratio equal to L(tV−i(b)).
18 A linear signal structure once again
guarantees that such an equilibrium exists and is unique.19
A natural question is whether and under what conditions the principal might prefer
voting to cheap talk communication (or, equivalently, conditional delegation).
Proposition 9 (Cheap Talk vs. Voting). The principal strictly prefers cheap talk
communication to voting with unanimous consensus.
Proposition 9 shows that voting is always strictly dominated by cheap talk. The principal
utilizes the information of the agent more with cheap talk. Intuitively, the agent considers
his vote with voting and his recommendation with cheap talk as pivotal in both organiza-
tional structures. However, a decision is pivotal under cheap talk for signal realizations of
the principal for which the optimal decision is more uncertain.20 Therefore, the agent ma-
nipulates his information less in order to reduce the probability that the principal will make
a wrong decision.
17We do not allow the players to abstain.
18Note that the equilibrium of the simultaneous voting game coincides with the equilibrium of the game
in which agents vote sequentially because agents behave as if they were pivotal in both games.
19Existence is trivial. Uniqueness follows from the observation that l(s)L(s) =
s
1+s is increasing in s, so that
the best-response functions can only intersect once.
20Recall that the principal follows the agent recommendation only at an intermediate range of signal
realizations.
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3.4 Cheap Talk with More than Two Messages
To show that cheap talk communication can dominate conditional delegation, it is enough
to focus on equilibria with three messages. So, suppose that the agent’s message space is
M = {m1,m2,m3} and that he follows the communication strategy21
m(sA) =

m1 if sA < t
A
1 ,
m2 if t
A
1 ≤ sA < tA2 ,
m3 if sA ≥ tA2 .
(13)
Given this strategy, the principal accepts after messagem1 orm3 if sP ≥ t¯(tA1 ) and sP ≥ t(tA2 ),
respectively. If she instead receives message m2, she knows that the agent’s signal is between
tA1 and t
A
2 . Thus, she accepts if, and only if, l(sP )L(tA1 , tA2 ) ≥ T (0) or sP ≥ tˆ(tA1 , tA2 ). By
MLRP, t(tA2 ) < tˆ(t
A
1 , t
A
2 ) < t¯(t
A
2 ). The same pivotal argument employed in the first part of
this section implies that the agent’s cutoff types must solve
l(tA1 )L
(
tˆ(tA1 , t
A
2 ), t¯(t
A
1 )
)
= T (b), (14)
l(tA2 )L
(
t(tA2 ), tˆ(t
A
1 , t
A
2 )
)
= T (b). (15)
As L (t(tA2 ), tˆ(tA1 , tA2 )) < l (tˆ(tA1 , tA2 )) < L (tˆ(tA1 , tA2 ), t¯(tA1 )) by MLRP, it follows that tA1 <
tA2 . This also shows that whenever such cutoffs exist and are interior, they are part of an
informative equilibrium with three messages. In general, existence clearly hinges on the size
of the bias which puts an upper bound on how many messages can be sent in equilibrium.
With a linear signal structure, the unboundedness of the likelihood ratios implies that an
equilibrium with three messages always exists.22 We summarize the analysis so far in the
following proposition.
21For the sake of expositional clarity, we omit the dependence of the cutoffs from the agent’s bias b.
22The same construction can be extended to an arbitrary number N of messages. To see this, let {tA0 =
0, tA1 , ..., t
A
n−1, t
A
n = 1} denote a partition of [0, 1] such that the agent sends message mj if sA ∈
[
tAj−1, t
A
j
)
.
Then, we can define thresholds
{
tˆ(tAj−1, t
A
j )
}n−1
j=1
such that the principal accepts after receiving message mj
if, and only if, sP ≥ tˆ(tAj−1, tAj ). By MLRP, tˆ(tAj−1, tAj ) > tˆ(tAj , tAj+1), for any j = 1, ..., n − 1. Finally, each
cutoff tAj must solve
l(tAj )L
(
tˆ(tAj , t
A
j+1), tˆ(t
A
j−1, t
A
j )
)
= T (b). (16)
Equation (16) follows again from a pivotal argument. Given the agent’s equilibrium strategy, sending message
mj+1 is better than sending message mj when the principal’s signal lies in the interval
[
tˆ(tAj , t
A
j+1), tˆ(t
A
j−1, t
A
j )
)
provided that sA ≥ tAj . This is because mj+1 induces acceptance while mj leads to rejection. Similarly, the
agent optimally sends message mj when his signal lies slightly below t
A
j . At t
A
j , the agent must be indifferent
between the two messages.
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Proposition 10. Cheap talk communication dominates conditional delegation.
The main difference between Proposition 10 and Dessein’s result lies in the combination
of a restricted action space (which is binary here) and information on the receiver’s side.
Both assumptions are quite natural in many relevant applications, like grant approvals, etc.
With an expert receiver, the act of delegating authority serves the dual purpose of allowing
for a better use of the agent’s information (as in Dessein) and communicating information to
the agent (which is missing in Dessein). When the principal is uninformed, the second effect
is irrelevant but a restricted action space prevents the agent from fine tuning his information
to the optimal action. This makes cheap talk communication and delegation equivalent for
the principal. With an expert principal, conditional delegation also puts an upper bound on
how much information can be inferred from delegating authority to the agent. Therefore,
cheap talk communication allows for finer partitioning of the agent’s information with the
additional benefit for the principal of using her information optimally.23
3.5 Optimal Delegation with a Binary Message Space
In this section, we consider the more general case of optimal delegation. While the full
characterization of the optimal mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, we discuss how
the principal might improve her payoff through commitment in the context of our leading
example with a linear signal structure.
Equilibrium of the cheap talk game incorporates the sequential rationality notion that
the principal best-responds with thresholds t
(
tCA (b)
)
and t¯
(
tCA (b)
)
to the agent’s reporting
cutoff tCA (b). We now illustrate the potential gain to the principal from committing ex-
ante (i.e., before observing her own signal) to different thresholds t < t¯ which need not be
sequentially rational. More precisely, the principal commits to the following decision rule
d(sP ,m|t, t¯) =
{
Accept if m = Accept & sP ≥ t, or m = Reject & sP ≥ t¯,
Reject otherwise.
(17)
The agent takes thresholds t < t¯ as given. With signal sA, the agent optimally recom-
23Recently, Kolotilin, Li, and Li (2013) have shown that the principal can benefit from the ability to
commit ex-ante (i.e., before communication) to a restricted action space ex-post (i.e., after communication)
through an increase in the quality of communication compared to the baseline model of Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Those authors start from an unrestricted action space while we consider environments in which
only two actions are feasible. Thus, it is unclear what the effect of a larger action space would be in our
framework and if a binary action space would necessarily be optimal.
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mends acceptance if and only if
UA (t ≤ sP < t¯|sA) ≥ 0, (18)
a slight modification of (6). Modifying (7), the agent recommends acceptance when sA ≥
tOA (b) which solves
l
(
tOA (b)
)L (t, t¯) = T (b) . (19)
The linear signal structure implies that
tOA (b) =
T (b)
L (t, t¯) + T (b) =
(2− t− t¯)T (b)
(t+ t¯) + (2− t− t¯)T (b) . (20)
Taking into account the agent’s best response, the principal’s utility as a function of
thresholds t < t¯ is
UP (t, t¯) = pRG
[
Pr
(
sA ≥ tOA (b) , sP ≥ t|G
)
+ Pr
(
sA < t
O
A (b) , sP ≥ t¯|G
)]
(21)
− (1− p)RB
[
Pr
(
sA ≥ tOA (b) , sP ≥ t|B
)
+ Pr
(
sA < t
O
A (b) , sP ≥ t¯|B
)]
.
For the purpose of maximization of UP over thresholds t < t¯, the scale of UP is irrelevant,
so we normalize pRG = 1 which then implies that (1− p)RB = T (0) > T (b). To simplify
the analysis, we further assume that T (0) = 1. We can then write the principal’s expected
utility for an arbitrary pair of thresholds (t, t¯) as
UP (t, t¯) = 2t¯− t¯2 − t2 −
(
t¯2 − t2) (2− t− t¯) (2− t− t¯)T (b)2 + (t+ t¯)
[(t+ t¯) + (2− t− t¯)T (b)]2 . (22)
Proposition 11 shows that the principal benefits from commitment power.
Proposition 11. Commitment power increases the principal’s expected utility compared to
the equilibrium with no commitment.
Furthermore, unconditional delegation, that is, (t, t¯) = (0, 1), is never optimal.
As the principal can always commit to the equilibrium thresholds, it is natural that she
finds commitment power beneficial.
Proposition 11 also shows that the principal can never benefit from delegating authority
unconditionally to the agent, as in Dessein (2002). Suppose that the principal committed to
unconditional delegation. This implies that the principal behaves as if she were uninformed
because she will ignore her signal. Thus, only one signal is used in equilibrium. Now fix
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t = 0 and consider a small reduction in t¯ from t¯ = 1. By reducing t¯ the principal instead
uses her own information when the signal she receives is very informative which increases
her expected utility given that more information is used. However, the overall effect of such
a reduction in t¯ depends on its effect on the agent’s best-response. Inspection of (20) shows
that a reduction in t¯ always increases the agent’s cutoff tOA(b) which is also beneficial for
the principal as the agent uses a higher standard for acceptance. Therefore, conditional
delegation is always preferable.
This discussion highlights two simple but important observations. First, the principal
is necessarily better off by exploiting some of her information. Second, commitment to
thresholds 0 < t < t¯ < 1 can be used to affect the agent’s incentives and, consequently, his
strategic manipulation.
The next Proposition 12 refines the previous discussion by showing that the principal has
at least a local incentive to commit to lower thresholds compared to the equilibrium ones.
Proposition 12. At the equilibrium thresholds, the principal has a (local) incentive to com-
mit to lower thresholds, that is,
∂UP (t(tCA(b)),t¯(tCA(b)))
∂t
< 0 and
∂UP (t(tCA(b)),t¯(tCA(b)))
∂t¯
< 0.
To further illustrate these ideas, we consider a simple example.
Example. With a linear signal structure, the equilibrium when T (0) = 1 yields the following
best-response functions for the principal
t
(
tCA (b)
)
=
1− tCA (b)
2
, t¯
(
tCA (b)
)
=
2− tCA (b)
2
.
The equilibrium condition (7) becomes the quadratic
tCA (b) =
(
1 + 2tCA (b)
)
T (b)
(3− 2tCA (b)) + (1 + 2tCA (b))T (b)
, (23)
solved by
tCA (b) =
1
4
−
√
4 + (1− T (b)) (5− 9T (b))− 2
4 (1− T (b)) . (24)
For instance, when T (b) = 5/9, the solution is tCA (b) = 1/4 with t
(
tCA (b)
)
= 3/8 and
t¯
(
tCA (b)
)
= 7/8. For T (b) = 5/9, the optimal commitment solution is roughly (t∗, t¯∗) =
(29/100, 3/4) with tOA(b) = 0.339. The commitment solution has lower thresholds than the
no commitment case, that is, t∗ < t
(
tCA(b)
)
and t¯∗ < t¯
(
tCA(b)
)
, which leads to a higher
reporting cutoff tOA(b) > t
C
A(b). The principal distorts her own thresholds by committing to
follow the agent’s recommendation more often after bad signals and to unilaterally accept
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more often after good signals. These distortions are optimal because they induce the agent
to adopt a higher standard when recommending acceptance.
As illustrated in the example, commitment power generates a new trade-off for the prin-
cipal between the loss of information due to the suppression of her own information and the
loss of information due to the agent’s strategic manipulation of his own information. This
is different from the standard trade-off between loss of information and loss of control, as in
Dessein (2002), and stems from the fact that the principal is also informed. The example
that we analyzed shows that suppression of information may be inevitable to reduce the
agent’s equilibrium amount of information manipulation.
4 Conclusion
This paper compares the performance of several organizational arrangements for aggregating
information. We revisit the classic trade-off between centralization and delegation of author-
ity in a framework with a binary action space and continuous noisy signals. We show that
delegation is equivalent to cheap talk communication when the principal is uninformed and
communication is informative. This result contrasts with that of Dessein’s (2002). This is
because a restricted action space improves the informativeness of cheap talk communication
and can reduce (eliminate, in our case) the information loss experienced by the principal in
standard delegation models based on Crawford and Sobel (1982). When the principal is also
an expert, we show that conditional delegation is strictly suboptimal.
While we focused attention on cases in which the principal is only limited to commit
to a choice among given organizational structures, we sketched a partial characterization
of the optimal mechanism with commitment (but still without transfers) in our setup with
an expert principal. When the principal can commit to the way in which she uses the
information received by the agent, a new trade-off arises between suppression of information
on the principal’s side and information loss due to strategic manipulation on the agent’s
side. The full study of this trade-off would complement the existing literature on delegation
versus centralization and it is left for future work.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We first show that for any informative equilibrium in which
the agent sends more than two messages we can construct another informative equilibrium
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in which the agent sends only two messages and which is payoff-equivalent.24 Consider an
informative equilibrium in which the agent chooses among messages m1, ...,mn, with n ≥ 2.
Given that the final decision is binary, message mk leads to acceptance with probability
q(mk). Suppose without loss of generality that q(mk) ≤ q(mk+1) for k = 1, ..., n − 1 with
at least one strict inequality, so that messages are ordered. From previous observations,
we know that the agent would like the project to be accepted if, and only if, sA ≥ t∗A(b).
When sA > t
∗
A(b), the agent would be indifferent among any message that induces the
highest probability of acceptance. Similarly, he would be indifferent among any message
that induces the lowest probability of acceptance when sA < t
∗
A(b).
25 Partitioning the set of
messages according to their probability of acceptance, we can construct another equilibrium
in which the agent uses the first and the last elements of the partition as messages. These
equilibria are clearly payoff-equivalent. Thus, we can restrict attention to equilibria with at
most two messages and, without loss of generality, M = {Reject, Accept}.
Suppose that there exists tˆA ∈ (0, 1) such that the agent is indifferent between inducing
acceptance or rejection at signal tˆA. MLRP implies that the agent is strictly better off
recommending rejection for any signal below tˆA, and acceptance otherwise. Thus, in any
informative equilibrium the agent uses a cutoff strategy. Furthermore, MLRP also implies
that there can only be one signal at which the agent is indifferent which corresponds to t∗A(b).
Suppose that p < RB
RG+RB
and fix a bias b > 0. Suppose also that the principal thinks
that the agent recommends acceptance if, and only if, sA ≥ t∗A(b). Note that p < RBRG+RB
implies that 0 < t∗P < 1 = t¯
∗
P . The principal always rejects after a negative recommen-
dation from the agent which is interpreted as the event in which sA < t
∗
A(b). Conditional
on this event, it is indeed optimal for the agent to recommend rejection. So, suppose that
sA ≥ t∗A(b). Note that an increase in the agent’s bias reduces his own threshold for accep-
tance, that is,
dt∗A(b)
db
< 0. Then, monotonicity and continuity of t∗A(b) in b imply that there
exists b¯ > 0 such that t∗A(b) > t
∗
P if, and only if, b ∈ [0, b¯). For the linear signal structure,
b¯ ≡ RG pRG+(1−p)RBRB−p(RG+RB) > 0. This implies that as long as the agent’s bias is below b¯, the con-
jectured communication strategy is incentive compatible and the equilibrium is informative,
that is, the principal follows the agent’s recommendation. If instead b > b¯, the previous
communication strategy is still incentive compatible. However, the principal always rejects
regardless of the recommendation. Thus, the equilibrium is uninformative.
Finally, suppose that p ≥ RB
RG+RB
. The principal is so optimistic about the project that
24With more than two messages, we say that an equilibrium is informative if there exist at least two
messages m1 and m2 such that d(m1) 6= d(m2).
25When sA = t
∗
A(b), the agent is indifferent between acceptance and rejection but this event happens with
zero probability because the signal distribution is continuous.
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she always accepts after a positive recommendation (i.e., t∗P = 0). Thus, the agent is better
off recommending acceptance exactly when sA ≥ t∗A(b). So, suppose that sA < t∗A(b). As
t∗A(b) < t¯
∗
P ≤ 1, the principal always rejects after a negative recommendation. Rejection is
also preferred by the agent. Thus, the conjectured strategy is incentive compatible and the
equilibrium is informative.
Proof of Proposition 3: The probability of a Type-I error is given by P I = (1 −
p)Prob(sA ≥ t∗A(b)|B) = (1 − p) (1− FB(t∗A(b))) whenever communication is informative.
Clearly, an increase in the bias reduces the cutoff t∗A(b) which necessarily increases the prob-
ability of false acceptance.
Next, differentiating b¯ with respect to the prior belief p gives ∂b¯
∂p
=
2RBR
2
G
[RB−p(RB+RG)]2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: The inequality (6) is equivalent to
Prob
(
G|sA, t(tCA(b)) ≤ sP < t¯(tCA(b))
)
=
pl(sA)L
(
t(tCA(b)), t¯(t
C
A(b))
)
pl(sA)L (t(tCA(b)), t¯(tCA(b))) + (1− p)
≥ RB
RG +RB + b
.
(25)
The agent recommends acceptance if, and only if, l(sA)L(t(tCA(b)), t¯(tCA(b))) ≥ T (b). Thus, if
there exists tCA(b) such that l(t
C
A(b))L(t(tCA(b)), t¯(tCA(b))) = T (b), the agent is indeed (weakly)
better off recommending acceptance if, and only if, sA ≥ tCA(b) by MLRP.
With a linear signal structure, the equilibrium characterization implies that the agent’s
cutoff, whenever interior, must solve the following equation
t =
[2− (t¯(t) + t(t))]T (b)
[2− (t¯(t) + t(t))]T (b) + (t¯(t) + t(t)) ≡ RHS(t). (26)
It is immediate to show that an equilibrium always exists because RHS(0), RHS(1) ∈
(0, 1) and dRHS(t)
dt
> 0, and all equilibria are interior for any b > 0. Uniqueness follows
from the fact that l(t)L(t(t), t¯(t)) is increasing in t. Finally, let M(t) ≡ t(t) + t¯(t). As an
increase in the bias reduces T (b), it reduces the reporting cutoff tCA(b) because
∂RHS(t)
∂T (b)
=
2M(t)(2−M(t))
[2T (b)+(1−T (b))M(t)]2 is positive by M(t) < 2 for any t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 8: The principal’s expected utility in the informative cheap talk
equilibrium is given by
UCTP =pRG
{
[1− FG(tCA(b))][1− FG(tC1 (b))] + FG(tCA(b))[1− FG(tC2 (b))]
}
− (1− p)RB
{
[1− FB(tCA(b))][1− FB(tC1 (b))] + FB(tCA(b))[1− FB(tC2 (b))]
}
, (27)
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where tC1 (b) = t(t
C
A(b)) and t
C
2 (b) = t¯(t
C
A(b)). The principal commits a Type-I error in
the bad state and a Type-II error in the good state when either she receives a positive
recommendation and her signal is above t(tCA(b)) or if she receives a negative recommendation
and her signal exceeds t¯(tCA(b)).
The principal’s expected utility from conditional delegation is given by
UDelP =pRG
{
1− FG(tD2 (b)) + [FG(tD2 (b))− FG(tD1 (b))][1− FG(tDA(b))]
}
− (1− p)RB
{
1− FB(tD2 (b)) + [FB(tD2 (b))− FB(tD1 (b))][1− FB(tDA(b))]
}
. (28)
A direct comparison of the equilibrium conditions under both organizational arrange-
ments together with the requirement that the equilibrium is unique implies that tDA(b) =
tCA(b), t
D
1 (b) = t
C
1 (b) and t
D
2 (b) = t
C
2 (b). Thus, a straightforward calculation shows that
UCTP = U
Del
P .
Proof of Proposition 9: We can renormalize the principal and agent’s payoffs in terms of
costs of making the wrong decision. While RB is the cost of false acceptance, we can think
of RG as the cost of false rejection rather than the payoff from correct acceptance. With
this reformulation, the principal’s maximization problem can be reinterpreted in terms of
minimizing the cost of making a wrong decision and we can then apply Proposition 6 in Li
and Suen (2004) to show that conditional delegation, and thus cheap talk, dominates voting.
Proof of Propositions 11 and 12: We investigate how UP varies along any anti-diagonal
defined by M = t+ t¯, where M ∈ [0, 2]. On such a line, the free parameter t varies between
max{0,M − 1} and M
2
. Substituting for M into (22) gives
UP (t,M − t) = 2(M − t)− t2 − (M − t)2 −M(2−M)(M − 2t) (2−M)T (b)
2 +M
[M + (2−M)T (b)]2 , (29)
which is a concave quadratic function of our free parameter t. Differentiating with respect
to t gives
dUP (t,M − t)
dt
= −4t+ 2(M − 1) + 2M(2−M) (2−M)T (b)
2 +M
[M + (2−M)T (b)]2 . (30)
At t = 0 and M = 1, the derivative is positive which shows that the principal is better off
increasing t away from 0. Thus, unconditional delegation cannot be optimal.
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Finally, evaluating the derivative at the equilibrium thresholds
(
t(tCA(b)), t¯(t
C
A(b))
)
gives
∂UP
(
t(tCA(b)), t¯(t
C
A(b))
)
∂t
=
8T (b)
[3− 2tCA(b) + (1 + 2tCA(b))T (b)]2
2tCA(b)− 1
2
, (31)
which is negative because tCA(b) <
1
2
from (24). Similarly, it can be shown that
∂UP (t(tCA(b)),t¯(tCA(b)))
∂t¯
<
0. This shows that the principal can increase her expected utility compared to the no com-
mitment case by locally decreasing both thresholds.
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